Prefer the shorter argument? Read De-risking Banking, One Town at a Time, our public facing companion article.
Why rebuild banking from the town upwards?
Britain has become accustomed to a peculiar arrangement. We place our salaries, pensions, business receipts and savings into banks because we need somewhere dependable to keep and move money. Yet ordinary banking is bound up with institutions that also make commercial lending decisions, pursue returns, carry complex risks and can become so important that their failure threatens the wider economy. The customer seeking a safe current account is not necessarily seeking exposure to the banking industry's appetite for risk.
Our proposal begins with a different question: what would a bank look like if safeguarding local people's deposits were its first, measurable duty, rather than one responsibility buried in a vast banking group?
The answer is a network of independently governed community banks, each rooted in a defined local area, each offering ordinary personal and business current accounts and savings, each maintaining a substantial, independently verifiable reserve of readily accessible financial assets against its deposits, supported by robust payment arrangements and clearly defined depositor protection. They would share expensive national infrastructure through a publicly sponsored Community Banking Foundation but retain local accountability and independently controlled lending.
This is a proposal to de-risk banking one town at a time. We replace opaque risk taking with visible reserves, limit what local banks may do with their balance sheets, and separate safe deposits from capital that investors knowingly put at risk. We do not need to make every bank in Britain behave this way overnight. We can establish one local bank, prove the model, establish the next and build a nationwide alternative through accumulation.
The founding principles are plain: Independent in ownership. Local in purpose. Collective in strength. And above all: Saving should be safe. Investing should be a choice. Risk should be understood, never disguised.
The bank on the high street, with a national engine behind it
The common obstacle to genuinely small banks is not the absence of local demand. It is the expense of the machinery that modern banking requires: payment networks, technology, cyber security, reporting, compliance, fraud management, audit and specialist staff. Requiring every town to build the same machinery again would defeat the purpose.
The Community Banking Foundation would provide that machinery once and make it available across an expanding network. Its business model would combine an annual infrastructure charge per customer with a defined share of participating banks' profits. Each local bank would have a properly constituted board, its own balance sheet and a staffed public office. It would provide personal and business accounts and lend within the geographical community it serves, subject to its own capital limits.
Public sponsorship matters. The government could bring an existing banking institution into public ownership, recapitalise and restructure it, and use its authorised operations, skills and systems as the foundation of the shared platform. The 2008 intervention in RBS and Lloyds establishes the precedent for extensive state ownership and recapitalisation. The proposed step here would be to put that capability to a permanent public purpose: making small independent banks collectively affordable.
Nationalise the infrastructure. Localise the banking. Shared technology does not grant separate local banks an automatic banking licence: each would require proper authorisation, or Parliament would need to establish a suitable alternative legal structure. The design must protect local deposits from liabilities accumulated in the platform's other commercial activities.
What risk do we actually remove?
Banking cannot be stripped of every risk. Payments can be disrupted, fraud can occur and loans can fail. What we can do is stop treating the liquidity of ordinary savings as a resource that may be quietly committed to other purposes. Our community banks would be barred from stock market speculation and would hold the assets supporting deposits in prescribed safe, readily accessible forms.
Our proposed Depositor Protection Principle would require each community bank to maintain a substantial reserve of unencumbered, readily accessible financial assets relative to its customer deposits, well supported by its own loss-absorbing capital and a clearly defined deposit protection arrangement. These are financial balances and suitable liquid instruments, not bundles of banknotes in a local office. The precise reserve requirement should be set through a transparent prudential standard that is intentionally conservative and designed to withstand a severe withdrawal shock. The shared national platform would operate payments and settlement services, without pooling away the local bank's separate responsibility for its depositors. We would not make the ability to meet ordinary withdrawals depend on selling long-term local loans or obtaining emergency public assistance.
Ordinary lending would be constrained by the bank's own capital and buffers without compromising its substantial liquid reserve. Shareholders and other risk capital providers would bear lending losses. The government would provide an additional defined guarantee for eligible community bank deposits, not an indiscriminate guarantee of the mothership's shareholders or speculative investments. The statutory FSCS protection applicable to eligible deposits remains a separate existing safeguard.
Every month the bank would publish, in language anyone can understand, how much local customers have deposited, how much has been lent, how much is immediately available, what is in arrears and what amount is assessed as at risk. We would also publish its Deposit Liquidity Ratio. The public should not have to be a bank analyst to establish whether the bank holding its money could give it back.
How much of our deposits do existing banks keep readily available?
Britain does not require its commercial banks to keep a fixed percentage of every customer deposit in cash. Instead, banks maintain different forms of liquidity, including cash, central bank balances and qualifying liquid securities. Their main Liquidity Coverage Ratio requirement is measured against forecast net cash outflows during a severe 30-day period, not against the entire deposit book. The regulatory minimum for institutions subject to that requirement is 100% of those stressed net outflows.
The difference can be seen in the published financial statements of three UK banking groups. Expressing cash and central bank balances as a percentage of customer deposits gives the following snapshot:
| Banking group and reporting date | Customer deposits | Cash and central bank balances | Share of deposits |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lloyds, December 2025 | £496.5bn | £56.7bn | 11.4% |
| NatWest, December 2025 | £443.0bn | £85.2bn | 19.2% |
| Starling, March 2025 | £12.1bn | £6.69bn | 55.4% |
Figure 1. Calculated from each bank's published 2025 balance sheet. The comparison measures cash and central bank balances against customer deposits; it is not the regulator's overall liquidity measure. Banks also hold qualifying liquid securities and other assets.
Read the figures as actual financial balances rather than a hypothetical bank run: at the reporting dates shown, Lloyds disclosed £56.7 billion in cash and balances at central banks against £496.5 billion in customer deposits; NatWest disclosed £85.2 billion against £443.0 billion; Starling disclosed £6.69 billion against £12.1 billion. Put another way, each £100 of customer deposits corresponded to roughly £11.40, £19.20 and £55.40 respectively in this narrowly defined category of assets. The remaining deposits are not necessarily missing or unbacked: banks also hold customer loans, government bonds and other assets, with different degrees of liquidity and risk.
The legal and regulatory test is different. Under the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), qualifying banks must generally hold enough high-quality liquid assets to meet 100% of their forecast net cash outflows over a severe 30-day stress period. A 100% LCR is not a requirement to maintain 100% of deposit liabilities in cash. The Bank of England reported an average LCR of 142% for major UK banks in May 2026, compared with a 100% regulatory floor. The same report recorded an average of 272% among its group of smaller and medium-sized banks. These ratios measure liquid assets relative to modelled net outflows, not the proportion of deposits held as cash.
For our Community Banking Foundation, there is no need to begin by copying either the conventional cash-to-deposits percentage or the regulatory stress assumptions. We propose a substantial, visible, conservatively managed reserve relative to deposits, accompanied by local lending limits, loss-absorbing capital and a dedicated depositor protection arrangement. The reserve level would be set through the community banking charter, published in straightforward figures, and held in appropriate financial assets through the banking system. We have deliberately not fixed that level at 70%, 100% or any other number.
These comparisons give our proposal a proper point of departure. Instead of treating an institution's internal liquidity position as incomprehensible information for specialists, each community bank would publish how much it holds in liquid reserves, what proportion of deposits those reserves represent and how the balance is protected. We can demand substantially greater transparency and a deliberately conservative reserve policy without pretending that the reserve has to be kept in cash or that a percentage has already been agreed.
A nationalised platform, not another banking empire
Building a new bank from nothing is expensive. Britain has already demonstrated that the state can take substantial stakes in banks and recapitalise them, as it did with RBS and Lloyds during the financial crisis. The government could use a similar intervention, potentially including public ownership of an existing institution, for an entirely different purpose: creating permanent banking infrastructure for communities.
The established bank would become the mothership. Its systems, payments capability, commercial expertise, staff and regulatory processes would be reviewed, repaired where necessary and developed as a common service. Risks from its existing commercial activities would be isolated from the protected community banking network. This is not a proposal to guarantee its shareholders or speculative losses.
| PUBLICLY CONTROLLED BANKING PLATFORM Payments • Technology • Administration • Risk services • Reporting | ||
| ↓ | ↓ | ↓ |
| ESSEX Community Bank | KENT Community Bank | NORFOLK Community Bank |
| Local governance • Local investment • Local relationships |
Figure 2. Proposed structure. Shared infrastructure does not itself duplicate a banking licence; genuinely separate deposit-taking banks would still require appropriate authorisation or a newly designed legal framework.
A community seeking to open its own bank would provide meaningful founding capital, an acceptable board and evidence of local demand. Founding sponsors could provide appropriately limited, asset-backed personal guarantees for specified commitments. Independent directors would be accountable for professional competence and conduct without being compelled to guarantee every customer deposit. Outside investors could participate without acquiring the right to direct lending to themselves.
The Foundation would charge a transparent annual fee per customer for common services and retain an agreed share of distributable profits. Local banks could charge reasonable account fees, reflecting the real cost of operating a branch and supporting customers. This is not about making banking free by hiding its costs somewhere else. It is about sharing those costs and making them understandable.
Let the community see its bank's position
Every participating bank would publish simple monthly figures in its local office and online. How much has been deposited? How much has been lent? What liquid financial assets are available to honour customer withdrawals? What is at risk? What proportion of borrowers is in arrears? What is the Deposit Liquidity Ratio?
Technical regulatory accounts would continue, but alongside them should sit an intelligible public account. Standard definitions and independent audit would make the information comparable across communities. If an institution asks residents to trust it with their savings, the residents should be able to see what it is doing.
What would it cost?
A previous illustrative pilot envisaged ten community banks, each raising £1 million locally, with the Foundation supplying £4 million per bank plus a £15 million shared infrastructure budget. That is £65 million in combined initial funding, of which £55 million would come from the state. Those figures are a design illustration, not an estimate of the amount a regulator would require. Acquiring or nationalising an existing banking platform could change the initial cost materially, while the stronger liquidity requirement could require additional liquid assets.
| Figure 5: illustrative pilot | Funding |
|---|---|
| Public investment in ten local banks | £40m |
| Local and private founding capital | £10m |
| Common infrastructure | £15m |
Figure 3. Hypothetical starting envelope, excluding acquisition costs, continuing expenses, additional liquidity needs and losses.
The Foundation might ultimately recycle capital released by maturing, profitable banks. It might also lose money. Public accountability requires that we say so openly and measure the benefits against the actual cost, rather than pretending a guarantee makes losses impossible.
From deposits to local decisions
Once the deposits are safe, the local economy can benefit
Community banking is not principally a scheme to subsidise start ups. It is a scheme to give people a safer, more accountable place to bank. But an institution that understands its local economy, has its own risk capital and is accountable to its neighbours can also do something valuable: lend to households and businesses whose needs may be poorly served by distant decision making.
Ordinary community lending would serve established local borrowers on prudent terms. A separately capitalised Enterprise Opportunity Fund would finance carefully assessed new enterprises, including credible founders without property to pledge, subject to an explicit loss budget. Ordinary depositors would retain the proposed legal protection, while enterprise lending risks would be borne by separately committed capital. We can be conservative with savers' money without being timid about what properly funded investment capital can accomplish.
The first conversation with an entrepreneur should be about their destination. One plumber wants a reliable living and a four day week; another wants a regional company employing dozens. The bank and entrepreneur can work backwards from those ambitions, establish what the business actually requires, and decide when and how much capital should be advanced.
Funding under the Opportunity Fund would carry a real obligation to work with qualified financial support and relevant experienced businesspeople. The bank already has the transaction records that form much of the cash picture; paired with invoices, liabilities and proper adjustments, those records can support useful management accounts. A seasoned plumber may be more helpful to a new plumber than a generic motivational session. What matters is what the support accomplishes.
A community bank that actually knows its community
The alternative is not to lend indiscriminately. It is to make careful lending an institutional purpose rather than an inconvenient exception. A community bank could assess established businesses using trading results, cash generation and repayment capacity. It could also hear the case of a new founder who has done the research, tested demand and prepared credible forecasts, even without conventional security.
The bank would have a physical office within the community: somewhere customers can meet a person, discuss a difficulty and receive an explanation. It would serve personal and business customers, and its ordinary lending would remain confined to its defined local area. Local knowledge would inform judgement, although it could never replace independent credit assessment.
Consider a 17 year old proposing a mobile car cleaning business. Enthusiasm alone would not secure a loan. But if the founder can show the likely demand, prices, costs, equipment required and a sensible route to profitability, the institution ought to be capable of responding with more than a rejection based on age or absent security. For someone legally too young for ordinary borrowing arrangements, business support, grants or staged equipment assistance may be the starting point.
A separate fund for people who have not yet had their chance
Ordinary community banking would be conservative. A dedicated Enterprise Opportunity Fund would do something different: assess carefully prepared proposals from new entrepreneurs, younger founders and people whose credit records make conventional finance difficult. The fund would be deliberately bounded and financed by capital whose investors understand that losses are possible, never by the protected reserves of everyday depositors.
Applicants would have to demonstrate work, not simply enthusiasm. The figures should be plausible, the market identifiable and the proposed spending connected to a realistic route to repayment or another clearly agreed form of return. Funding could be advanced in stages, accompanied by coaching and financial reporting. A refusal should come with a comprehensible reason and, where appropriate, a route towards a stronger application.
There should be a published ceiling on the fund's exposure and an explicit loss budget. Not every business will survive. This is precisely why the scheme must be designed around what happens in reality. We cannot promise opportunity without accepting that some opportunity will end in failure. We can, however, decide in advance how much risk the fund is able to absorb.
Everyone with a credible proposition deserves a fair hearing. Not everyone is entitled to a loan. The distinction protects both the entrepreneur and the community.
Evidence for the business lending opportunity
The evidence: the smallest applicants face the steepest climb
The Ipsos SME Finance Monitor Q4 2025, published in March 2026, provides a stark picture. Among applications with a concluded outcome over the 18 months from the third quarter of 2024 to the end of 2025, 51% of applications by businesses without employees resulted in finance. For businesses employing one to nine people, the figure was 58%. For those with 50 to 249 employees it was 92%. Applicants seeking a financial product for the first time were less successful than previous applicants: 47% against 65%.
| Business size | Applications resulting in finance | Relative success |
|---|---|---|
| No employees | 51% | |
| 1–9 employees | 58% | |
| 10–49 employees | 78% | |
| 50–249 employees | 92% |
Figure 4. Ipsos, SME Finance Monitor Q4 2025, chapter summaries, page 28. Outcomes cover several financial products and providers, not solely unsecured loans or the five largest banks.
Across concluded applications, 36% were declined and 9% received an offer the business chose not to accept. Among declined applicants, 24% reported credit issues as a stated reason, 15% business performance and 12% insufficient security. One in four said the lender had given them no reason. That is a troubling failure of explanation, particularly for someone trying to understand what to improve before applying again.
Only 36% of successful facilities required security. That does not mean the remaining borrowers possessed no assets: an unsecured facility can still be awarded to an established, wealthy or financially strong applicant. The survey does not isolate unsecured loans under £20,000 made by the five largest banks. The evidence still points squarely to the question worth asking: how many commercially credible people are turned away because they lack assets, credit history or an established relationship?
In a separate finding, 23% of SMEs described themselves as financially struggling in 2025, up from 18% in 2023. High trust in their main bank fell from 60% in 2021 and 2022 to 52% in 2025, with smaller and younger businesses reporting less trust. These are not mere statistics about sentiment. They describe a relationship that is under strain.
Why the established banking model leaves a gap
Large banks lend substantial sums to small and medium sized enterprises. Our argument is not that they lend nothing. It is that a secured loan to an established company is a different proposition from an unsecured £10,000 loan to a new business with no property to pledge. One is readily assessed against accounts and recoverable assets. The other depends upon judgement about people, demand, cash flow and the credibility of a future that has not yet happened.
Individual investigation is expensive. A small loan may need a business review, forecast testing, questions about pricing, and personal discussion, yet generate comparatively little interest income. When large lenders standardise those decisions, the cost of careful individual judgement becomes difficult to justify. Security is attractive because it gives the lender somewhere to turn if judgement proves wrong.
But a poor credit history is not necessarily a poor business idea, and an absence of collateral is not evidence of an absence of ability. We should not build a public policy around the fantasy that every able entrepreneur also happens to own a house.
Does getting finance help businesses create jobs?
Access to finance matters beyond the bank's balance sheet. A loan can help a business buy equipment, take on additional work and recruit staff. If a good business cannot obtain capital, the consequences may include jobs that are never created. We should therefore judge an enterprise lending programme not merely by how many loans are approved, but by what happens to local employment afterwards.
The Ipsos SME Finance Monitor Q4 2025 identifies differences in reported business growth and finance use, but its chapter summaries do not provide a direct figure for the share of successful borrowers who subsequently increased their employee numbers. We should not invent one. A separate government study does, however, provide a useful indication of the relationship.
The Department for Business and Trade's Longitudinal Small Business Survey 2025: panel report followed businesses surveyed in 2022. Among businesses recorded as having accessed external capital in 2022, 26.3% reported increased employment in 2025, compared with 23.0% of those that had not accessed capital in 2022. Their reported turnover growth in 2025 was 54.4% and 38.6%, respectively. These are observed differences, not proof that access to capital caused the growth; the two groups may differ in other respects.
| Businesses grouped by whether they accessed capital in 2022 | Increased employment in 2025 | Increased turnover in 2025 |
|---|---|---|
| Accessed external capital | 26.3% | 54.4% |
| Did not access external capital | 23.0% | 38.6% |
Employment evidence: Department for Business and Trade, Longitudinal Small Business Survey 2025 panel report. These figures track subsequent outcomes of two pre-existing groups; they do not isolate unsecured loans below £20,000 or establish the number of jobs directly created by finance.
What happens when finance reaches the people other lenders overlook?
We are no longer obliged to argue only from intuition. An independent evaluation of the British Business Bank's Start Up Loans programme, published in December 2024, examined loans made in 2018/19 and 2021/22. The programme pairs finance with support and mentoring, bringing it unusually close to the sort of enterprise assistance we are proposing. Among 804 loan recipients surveyed, the evaluators estimated 826 net additional employee jobs in the recipients' last completed financial year: approximately 1.03 additional jobs per loan, excluding the founders' own employment.
The evaluation also estimated that 68% of the value of finance supplied would not otherwise have been provided by mainstream lenders. That figure is based on recipients' responses, not an audit of every hypothetical bank decision. Even so, it puts an important question before us: if a programme can direct finance towards entrepreneurs whom conventional provision often misses, and those enterprises go on to create jobs, why should access to such support remain an exception rather than a permanent feature of local banking?
The researchers found stronger business survival than among comparison businesses: after five years, the advantage varied from four to 26 percentage points depending on the comparator. Their separate company data analysis found approximately 15% higher cumulative employment growth among a subset of beneficiary firms. These are findings about a particular programme and population, not a promise that every loan will create a job. They are, however, evidence that practical support and access to finance can have consequences well beyond the loan account.
| Start Up Loans independent evaluation | Reported finding |
|---|---|
| Surveyed loan recipients | 804 |
| Estimated net additional employee jobs among respondents' enterprises | 826 |
| Net additional employee jobs per surveyed loan | 1.03 |
| Estimated finance value not otherwise available from mainstream providers | 68% |
Figure 5. British Business Bank, independent Evaluation of Start Up Loans (2024). Estimates for the two evaluated lending cohorts, not a forecast for the proposed Community Banking Foundation. The 68% measure refers to finance value, not the proportion of individual loans.
The radical proposition is straightforward: a lack of private wealth should not be permitted to become a national shortage of enterprise. Our Community Banking Foundation would treat carefully assessed unsecured lending as a deliberate public purpose, alongside professional bookkeeping, business coaching and an explicitly funded allowance for failure. The applicants would still have to make a credible case. What they would no longer have to demonstrate, as the price of being heard, is that they already possess the wealth their enterprise is intended to create.
We should publish the cost of every such programme and the losses it incurs. But we should be every bit as demanding about the benefits: businesses launched, businesses surviving, wages paid, jobs created and the local economic activity that would otherwise have been forgone. The proper comparison is not risk against an imaginary world without failure; it is the cost of taking a measured chance against the cost of systematically denying one.
That is a beginning, not the end of the inquiry. For our proposed Enterprise Opportunity Fund, we should publish the number of businesses funded, the number still trading, their actual headcount at the start and at regular follow-up dates, and the number of jobs retained or added. The results should also show the performance of applicants who received coaching but no loan. A community bank's contribution should be visible in businesses supported and employment sustained, not just interest collected.
Begin with the destination, not the loan application
The first question at a community bank should be: what are you trying to achieve? One plumber may want an independent livelihood and a four-day week. Another may want a regional company with fifty engineers. Those ambitions demand different resources, organisational structures and borrowing plans, even if the entrepreneurs begin with the same tools and van.
Working backwards from the intended destination, the business owner and the bank's professional team can identify intermediate goals, skills, working capital, equipment, pricing, contingencies and likely funding stages. They can then review those assumptions as the business develops. The amount requested on an initial application is a starting estimate, not the definition of what the enterprise requires.
The Destination First Principle: define success in the entrepreneur's own terms, plan backwards from that outcome, and make lending serve the plan. A one-person business that reliably supports its founder is not a failed version of a business employing fifty people.
Underfunding is a measurable risk, not an incidental annoyance
In the British Business Bank's Business Finance Survey 2025, published in March 2026, 71% of SMEs approaching their first finance provider were offered the full amount sought; 11% were offered a smaller amount and 10% were turned down. In the 2019 survey, only 4% reported being offered less than requested. That proportion was 12% in 2022, 12% in 2023 and 11% in both 2024 and 2025.
| Survey year | Offered full amount | Offered less | Turned down |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2019 | 84% | 4% | 6% |
| 2020 | 84% | 5% | 4% |
| 2021 | 80% | 5% | 5% |
| 2022 | 64% | 12% | 14% |
| 2023 | 63% | 12% | 14% |
| 2024 | 71% | 11% | 14% |
| 2025 | 71% | 11% | 10% |
Figure 6. British Business Bank, Business Finance Survey 2025, page 16. Outcomes for SMEs seeking finance from their first provider; residual responses are excluded from this three-column presentation.
In the 2025 survey, among businesses refused finance, offered less or offered unfavourable terms, 27% abandoned the relevant plans and 26% put them on hold. When a business needs £11,000 to operate safely, offering £5,000 can be the difference between establishing a viable enterprise and creating a shortage before it has begun.
A useful illustration is our new plumber. Tools and a van may account for £4,500, but insurance, accounting, initial marketing, materials, working capital and contingencies may take the actual opening requirement to £11,000. A professional review should determine whether that is the right amount, whether the plan needs adjustment and how finance can be released in stages.
The banking records already provide much of the financial picture
Our proposal does not require every business owner to become a trained bookkeeper. The bank already holds a detailed record of money moving through the customer's accounts. With appropriate customer authority, transaction categorisation, access to invoices and bills, and records of outstanding obligations, an accountant can build and maintain useful management accounts.
Bank transactions alone are not a complete profit and loss account: they may miss accrued income and costs, unpaid invoices, inventory, depreciation and transactions outside the account. But they provide an excellent starting point for a shared accounting service that actively identifies unusual expenditure, overdue customer receipts, declining margins and approaching cash shortages.
Crucially, the bank can use that information to help the entrepreneur, not simply to scrutinise them. The same review that identifies a repayment risk might show that a business is consistently underpricing a profitable service or that it needs longer supplier terms. The objective is to correct the business problem before it becomes a banking problem.
A partnership with obligations on both sides
You want our money; you work with us. That is the principle for the Enterprise Opportunity Fund. Professional financial and commercial support is part of the finance agreement, beginning before the amount is approved and continuing for as long as the business needs it.
Support should be matched to the actual challenge. A young plumber may benefit from an experienced local plumber's knowledge of pricing, suppliers and difficult customers, combined with an accountant's expertise in cash flow and management accounts. An ambitious manufacturer may need production planning and recruitment advice. The owner retains control of commercial decisions but agrees to serious participation, reliable records and regular review.
The measure of this partnership is what support actually accomplishes: viable earnings for the owner, stronger margins, fewer cash emergencies, business survival, sustainable employment and responsible repayment. Attendance records and improved confidence do not pay an invoice.
Finance is only half the proposition
The same Ipsos study found that just 15% of SMEs had a business mentor, 40% prepared regular management accounts, 23% had a business plan, 41% used accounting software and 49% reported any planning activity. We need not assume every business without a mentor wants one. But we should recognise the opportunity in offering professional support where it is useful.
| Business practice | Share of SMEs in 2025 |
|---|---|
| Have a business mentor | 15% |
| Prepare regular management accounts | 40% |
| Have a business plan | 23% |
| Use accounting software | 41% |
| Report any planning activity | 49% |
Figure 7. Ipsos, SME Finance Monitor Q4 2025, chapter summaries, pages 10–11.
Our community banks could offer bookkeeping, management accounts, financial forecasting and access to properly qualified business coaches as part of their business banking service. The coach would help an owner see problems before they become emergencies, consider the consequences of decisions and test the financial assumptions behind an expansion.
These services would be transparent about price and professional responsibility. A business could use its own accountant, and a coach would not be rewarded for persuading customers to borrow. The lending decision would remain independently made. The purpose is to improve the business, not to create another sales channel for debt.
There is a potential commercial benefit too: accounting and coaching could generate service income for a bank that deliberately limits its lending. The costs and the demand would need to be demonstrated, but this is a business model worth developing, not merely a charitable add-on.
Evidence that hands-on support changes business results
England's Growth Hubs evaluation, published by government in 2023 and examining support delivered from 2015 to 2020, reported an average employment increase of 14% one year after initial support and 22% after five years. The comparison group showed no visible change. In the first year, turnover rose by 19% among supported firms versus 7% in the comparison group. These are observed economic outcomes, not satisfaction scores.
International randomised evaluations add useful evidence about the form of support. Brooks, Donovan and Johnson's Kenyan study found that entrepreneurs paired with experienced business owners operating in similar sectors increased their weekly profits by roughly 20%, while classroom business training had no comparable profit effect. In Mexico, Bruhn, Karlan and Schoar found that tailored management consulting improved productivity and returns on assets, with employment roughly 50% higher after five years among firms offered consulting.
Research integrating business training with microfinance in Peru found improvements in business practices and repayment performance. The broader lesson is practical: a bank that finances enterprise can strengthen its borrowers by helping them make better commercial decisions, not merely by distributing leaflets about good business practice.
The Start Up Loans evaluation offers a relevant design clue. Its survival model found a 60% survival probability for enterprises receiving loans up to £5,000, against 71% for those receiving more than £10,000. Loan size may reflect the quality of initial planning, available resources and the true amount needed. Our model brings practical support forward so the entrepreneur, accountant and experienced adviser establish the destination and required capital before agreeing the facility.
How the model should demonstrate its economic value
A Community Banking Foundation should publish the number of credible entrepreneurs financed without collateral, what the bank and borrower agreed the business was intended to achieve, and what the enterprise subsequently accomplished. That includes survival, cash generation, owner earnings, new jobs, loan arrears and actual losses. It should also publish the cost of the accounting and mentoring services and the resulting financial benefit to local businesses.
A small business that gives its owner a stable livelihood may have met its destination perfectly. A growth company may be expected to employ more people, and can be judged against that stated objective. Neither should be evaluated as though every entrepreneur wishes to build a national chain.
The core proposition is deliberately ambitious: lack of existing wealth should not prevent access to sensible enterprise finance, and the bank should contribute expertise as well as capital.
The ambition: a different default for British banking
Banking reform need not depend on persuading every major bank to reform itself. We could create a different sort of institution and invite communities to choose it. A safe current account with visible protection. A real person in a local office. A community able to see where its bank stands. Lending supported by genuine capital rather than the assumption that deposits can always be replaced. National systems shared across independent local institutions.
Success would first be measured in the safety, affordability, transparency and resilience of these banks; in the number of communities served; and in whether local people genuinely choose to entrust them with their business. The benefits to employment and enterprise would be measured too, but they would sit alongside the central banking mission rather than displace it.
De-risking Britain's banking industry, one town at a time.
Independent in ownership. Local in purpose. Collective in strength.
Prefer the shorter argument? Read De-risking Banking, One Town at a Time, our public facing companion article.