Interest Is Tomorrow’s Labour Spent Yesterday
Britain spent around £109 billion on debt interest in 2025/26.
That was approximately 3.6 per cent of the entire economy and 8 per cent of all public expenditure. It was one of the highest debt interest burdens Britain has experienced in the past half century.
Stop there for a moment.
Eight per cent of everything the public sector spends.
Not repaying the debt.
Not building something.
Not improving something.
Servicing the debt.
So here is the question we should be asking:
What could Britain build today if £109 billion a year were not already paying for yesterday?
The interest bill cannot manufacture doctors.
It cannot manufacture teachers.
It cannot manufacture electricity.
It cannot create additional hours in the working day.
Yet every pound committed to servicing debt represents a claim upon precisely those finite things: our labour, our resources, our productive capacity and our tax revenues.
This article advances a deliberately provocative proposition:
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
And if we have built an economy in which financial claims upon tomorrow are allowed to grow faster than tomorrow's ability to produce real value, we have a considerably bigger problem than an annual Budget deficit.
We have begun spending the future before the future has produced anything.
Money is not wealth
We have become accustomed to speaking about money as though money itself were wealth.
It isn't.
A hospital is wealth.
A power station is wealth.
A house is wealth.
A field producing food is wealth.
A machine capable of making useful things is wealth.
Human knowledge, skill and available working time are forms of real productive capacity.
Money is the mechanism we use to place claims upon them.
This distinction is not remotely revolutionary. The Bank of England explains that most money in the modern British economy is created when commercial banks make loans. If a bank lends someone £100, it credits the borrower's account with £100. New deposit money has been created.
And the Bank makes the crucial distinction itself:
“banks create money, not wealth.”
That sentence deserves considerably more attention than it usually receives.
We can create another £100 in a bank account.
No additional house has been created.
No additional worker has appeared.
No additional electricity has been generated.
No additional food has been grown.
No additional hour has been added to anyone's life.
The number representing claims on the economy can change far more easily than the economy's capacity to satisfy those claims.
That is where my concern about interest begins.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
The £100 loan and the missing £5
Suppose I borrow £100 at an interest cost of £5.
The bank can create the £100 deposit when it makes the loan.
But it does not create an additional £5 deposit at that moment simply because my loan agreement says that I must eventually repay £105.
That distinction matters.
The £5 is not best described as money that can never exist. That would be too crude and, importantly, wrong.
It is something subtler.
It is a new financial claim on money that must be obtained later.
I must earn it.
I must take it from existing savings.
I must sell something for it.
Someone must transfer it to me.
Or I must borrow again.
The loan has therefore brought £100 of purchasing power into the present while creating a larger claim against my future income.
No additional £5 of productive capacity was created when I signed the agreement.
No additional resources were discovered.
No additional five pounds' worth of human time magically appeared.
There is simply now a legally enforceable claim against value that must exist in the future.
That is the first half of the problem.
How much of tomorrow have we already promised?
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
Borrowing spends tomorrow before it arrives
There is good empirical evidence that this is not merely a philosophical description.
Research from the Bank for International Settlements examined household debt across 17 countries. It found that new borrowing tends initially to support economic activity, but that the debt servicing burden arrives later. The average delay between the borrowing boom and the peak in debt servicing was around four years.
More importantly, the later debt servicing burden explained much of the association between credit booms, weaker subsequent economic growth and increased risk of financial crisis.
That is remarkably close to the mechanism we are describing.
Borrow today.
Spend today.
Service tomorrow.
The initial borrowing makes us feel richer because we have increased what we can spend now.
The bill arrives later.
And because interest exists, tomorrow must surrender more purchasing power than yesterday originally received.
That is the crucial asymmetry.
Borrowing does not merely move consumption through time.
Interest makes the amount surrendered tomorrow greater than the amount brought forward yesterday.
A second BIS study found that high debt servicing burdens had substantial negative effects on subsequent expenditure and credit growth.
So this is not simply a moral objection to owing money.
There is a measurable economic drag.
The financial claim survives.
The activity that money might have supported does not necessarily survive with it.
Or, more simply:
Interest leaves the money standing. It kills what the money could have done.
The mortgage makes the problem visible
Housing gives us perhaps the clearest everyday example.
Imagine a £500,000 house financed entirely with a 25 year repayment mortgage.
At a constant interest rate of 5 per cent, repayments would total roughly £877,000.
At 6.5 per cent, total repayments pass £1 million.
We routinely describe this as buying a £500,000 house.
But that is not what happened to the buyer's life.
The buyer may have surrendered nearly £1 million of lifetime income to acquire an asset originally priced at £500,000.
The economically interesting measure is therefore not merely the purchase price.
It is how much of a human life had to be exchanged for the house.
If someone must work twenty years to acquire something rather than ten, that is an economic fact even if rising nominal house prices later make the balance sheet look handsome.
And now comes the particularly awkward part.
Credit does not merely enable people to afford a pre existing housing price.
Greater availability of credit can itself raise the price they must pay.
Research published in the American Economic Review found that an externally caused expansion in mortgage credit increased housing demand and house prices. Where housing supply could expand more easily, more houses were built and the price effect was smaller.
A later American Economic Review study estimated that changing credit standards explained between 32 and 53 per cent of the housing boom examined by the researchers.
The mechanism is not difficult to understand.
Suppose several people want the same house and each can borrow £200,000.
Now allow each of them to borrow £300,000.
We have increased their ability to bid.
But:
No additional house has been created.
No additional bedroom has appeared.
No additional garden has been laid out.
No additional acre of land has materialised.
If supply cannot respond, some of that extra credit can simply be absorbed into a higher price.
Then we borrow more money to pay the higher price.
Then we pay interest on the larger loan.
Then still more of our future labour becomes committed to acquiring essentially the same scarce resource.
The loop becomes:
more credit creates greater bidding power; greater bidding power supports higher prices; higher prices require larger mortgages; larger mortgages create larger interest claims on future income.
We keep trying to make expensive houses affordable by helping people borrow enough to make houses even more expensive.
That is not an argument against every mortgage.
It is an argument against pretending that expanding credit is the same thing as expanding housing.
It isn't.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
Interest can leave the money while killing the activity
There is an obvious objection.
If I pay £1,000 of interest, somebody else receives £1,000.
The money has not vanished.
Quite right.
But that does not mean the economic effect is neutral.
The Bank of England describes precisely this phenomenon.
When interest rates rise, borrowers pay more while savers receive more. In aggregate, we might imagine the two effects simply cancelling out.
They do not necessarily cancel.
Bank of England evidence suggests that British borrowers cut their spending by around £50 for every £100 increase in mortgage payments. Savers receiving additional interest income are less likely to increase their spending by the equivalent amount. The result is lower aggregate spending.
That gives us an important refinement.
Interest does not necessarily destroy money.
The lender still has it.
The saver still has it.
The bank still records it.
But economic activity can nevertheless disappear because the recipient of that income does not use it in the same way as the person from whom it was taken.
Hence:
Interest leaves the money standing. It kills what the money could have done.
That distinction is central.
We should stop asking only, “Where did the money go?”
We should also ask:
“What would that money have done?”
Would it have bought dinner in a restaurant?
Paid a builder?
Bought a new computer?
Supported another employee?
Allowed a family to save?
Allowed a business to invest?
Allowed government to employ a nurse?
Money can survive perfectly happily in an account while the activity it might otherwise have supported simply never happens.
Now make the borrower Britain
The household example is useful because we understand it instinctively.
But Britain is now operating the same mechanism on an extraordinary scale.
The Government spent around £109 billion on debt interest in 2025/26: 3.6 per cent of GDP and 8 per cent of all public expenditure.
Let us repeat that because it should be politically shocking.
Eight per cent of all public expenditure.
Before we have trained the doctor.
Before we have repaired the school.
Before we have bought the police car.
Before we have built the railway.
Before we have reduced anyone's tax bill.
A vast claim created by previous spending already has first call upon today's resources.
The interest bill cannot manufacture doctors.
It cannot manufacture teachers.
It cannot manufacture electricity.
It cannot create additional hours in the working day.
Yet those are the real things taxation ultimately commands.
And this is why the comforting argument that government debt is merely numbers on a balance sheet is inadequate.
The numbers represent claims on future tax revenues.
Future tax revenues represent claims on future economic activity.
And future economic activity ultimately means the work, production and resources of people who may not even have been born when some of the original borrowing occurred.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
Britain is not merely paying interest. We are struggling to stabilise the capital
There is some horrible economic jargon surrounding this, so let us dispense with it.
In November 2025, the Office for Budget Responsibility estimated that Britain was spending about £46 billion more on everything other than debt interest than it was raising to pay for those things.
To stop debt from continuing to grow relative to the size of the economy, Britain instead needed to be running a surplus before interest of roughly £54 billion.
In plain English, the gap between where the public finances were and where they needed to be merely to stabilise the debt burden was approximately £100 billion a year.
That does not mean Britain must immediately find £100 billion in spending cuts or taxes. Debt sustainability depends on growth, inflation, interest rates and many other moving parts.
But it demonstrates the scale of the problem.
We are not having a debate about finding a few billion pounds behind the Treasury sofa.
We are discussing a structural gap measured in tens of billions.
And if we borrow to cover interest, the mechanism becomes still more dangerous.
Old debt produces interest.
Interest contributes to borrowing.
Borrowing enlarges the debt.
The enlarged debt creates more interest.
Economists have a delightfully innocent sounding phrase for this.
They call it the snowball effect.
The OBR uses exactly this mechanism in its long term fiscal modelling. Under its 2024 unchanged policy scenario, rising borrowing increases debt and the larger debt creates higher interest costs, which increases borrowing again. By the end of that deliberately long range scenario, the OBR estimated that net interest payments would account for around 40 per cent of the increase in annual borrowing.
The OBR is emphatic that these very long term numbers are projections under specified assumptions, not predictions of what governments will actually permit to happen.
Quite so.
Governments would intervene.
But that is rather the point.
They would have to intervene because the arithmetic becomes unsustainable if they do not.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
When interest outruns growth
There is an established economic concept for precisely this problem: r minus g.
We need not be frightened by the notation.
The r broadly represents the interest rate being paid on debt.
The g represents the rate at which the economy grows.
If the economy grows sufficiently quickly, an existing stock of debt can become easier to carry.
Imagine owing £10,000 while earning £20,000 a year. Then imagine still owing £10,000 when your income has grown to £100,000. The debt has not disappeared, but its burden has changed dramatically.
Government debt works on the same broad principle.
But reverse it.
If the cost of debt grows faster than the economy supporting it, the burden becomes progressively harder to carry.
The IMF describes the interest and growth relationship as central to debt dynamics. The OBR similarly states that as debt rises and the gap between the interest rate and economic growth widens, larger government surpluses are required merely to stabilise debt.
So one of the central ideas behind this article is not remotely outside conventional economics.
Financial obligations can grow faster than the economy that must support them.
My argument is about what that means in human terms.
An economy does not pay interest with GDP percentages.
It pays with the output represented by those percentages.
With taxes.
With earnings.
With postponed consumption.
With reduced public spending.
With delayed investment.
With human time.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
Adam Smith saw the problem in 1776
There is a temptation to regard all of this as a peculiar feature of twenty first century finance.
Adam Smith would object.
In The Wealth of Nations, Smith devoted an entire chapter to public debts. He was deeply suspicious of governments discovering that borrowing allowed them to meet present demands while leaving the consequences elsewhere.
His description is wonderfully modern:
“The future liberation of the public revenue they leave to the care of posterity.”
Smith also confronted the argument that interest on domestic government debt does not really impoverish a country because one citizen pays another. He described the familiar defence as the right hand paying the left and rejected the conclusion that domestic public debt was therefore harmless.
And this deserves to be said plainly:
He was worrying about the encumbrance of future national income by accumulated public debt in 1776.
Nearly two and a half centuries later, we have turned that concern into an economic operating model.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
What I am not claiming
There is no need to weaken this argument by claiming more than the evidence supports.
I am not claiming that every pound of interest mechanically creates another pound of inflation.
I am not claiming that the difference between the world's stock of money and the world's stock of debt can simply be labelled “compound interest”.
I am not claiming that lending never finances productive activity. A loan that builds a factory, educates someone, develops technology or creates infrastructure can unquestionably enable the creation of additional wealth.
Nor am I claiming that lenders should receive nothing for risk, deferred consumption or the use of their resources.
Those are separate arguments.
The proposition here is narrower and, I think, much harder to escape.
The interest itself is a claim on future value. It is not the creation of that value.
If the activity financed by debt creates more real value than the total financing burden consumes, society may still be better off.
But we should stop confusing the usefulness of the thing financed with the economic character of the interest charged for financing it.
One creates.
The other claims.
And when the claims begin growing faster than the creation, we have a problem.
The two problems
We therefore face two connected questions.
The first is the stock problem:
How much of tomorrow have we already promised?
The second is the flow problem:
How much of today are we spending honouring yesterday's promises?
Britain's £109 billion annual interest bill is part of the flow problem.
Our enormous stock of public, mortgage, corporate and personal debt is part of the stock problem.
The two feed each other.
Debt creates claims against future income.
Interest enlarges those claims.
Servicing them removes money from other activity.
Weaker activity can mean weaker growth.
Weaker growth makes existing debt harder to support.
Further borrowing can then be used to bridge the gap.
And the wheel turns again.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
This is ultimately a political argument
Fiscal responsibility cannot simply mean finding enough money to make this year's interest payment.
That is servicing the problem.
It is not solving it.
A serious national debt strategy must eventually reduce the capital itself.
That means confronting something British politics has spent decades avoiding: we cannot indefinitely promise ourselves more than the economy produces and hand the invoice to people who come after us.
That does not automatically mean crude austerity.
Cutting productive investment can leave us poorer and make the debt harder to support.
Destroying public services simply to improve this year's accounts can be equally foolish.
And imposing the entire burden upon households with the least room to absorb it would be both economically destructive and morally indefensible.
It means something more difficult.
We must decide openly what we are prepared to pay for.
We must stop treating permanent borrowing as ordinary income.
We must distinguish investment that genuinely increases future productive capacity from spending that simply postpones today's bill.
Where taxation has to rise to restore the public finances, those with the widest shoulders should carry the greater proportion of the burden, particularly where decades of rising asset values and easy credit have delivered them the greatest benefits.
And, above all, government should publish a credible long term plan not merely to service the national debt, but ultimately to reduce its burden.
There will be arguments about pace.
There will be arguments about taxation.
There will be ferocious arguments about what government should and should not do.
Good.
Those are democratic arguments.
But first we must stop pretending the underlying problem does not exist.
£109 billion a year is not an accounting curiosity.
It is choice.
It is opportunity.
It is infrastructure not built.
It is taxation that cannot be reduced.
It is public services that cannot be funded.
It is private spending that cannot take place.
The money may still exist.
The opportunity does not.
Interest leaves the money standing. It kills what the money could have done.
And every time we borrow without asking how the debt will ultimately be extinguished, we make another claim upon people who will have to work after today's spending is long forgotten.
That is why this matters.
Not because debt is immoral.
Not because banks are evil.
Not because money is fictitious.
But because the real economy is finite even when financial claims are not.
We can create another promise.
We cannot create another hour.
We can issue another bond.
We cannot issue another acre of land.
We can refinance another debt.
We cannot refinance a human lifetime.
Eventually every financial claim meets the real economy.
And somebody has to provide what was promised.
Interest is tomorrow’s labour spent yesterday.
Sources
Bank of England, “How is money created?” Explains that commercial bank lending creates deposits and makes the distinction that banks create money rather than wealth. Bank of England.
House of Commons Library, “What are government debt and debt interest?” Source for the approximately £109 billion UK debt interest bill in 2025/26, equivalent to 3.6 per cent of GDP and 8 per cent of public expenditure. House of Commons Library.
Office for Budget Responsibility, Economic and Fiscal Outlook, November 2025. Source for Britain's primary deficit, the debt stabilising primary balance and the approximately £100 billion gap between the two in 2025/26. OBR.
Office for Budget Responsibility, Fiscal Risks and Sustainability, September 2024. Long term scenario analysis showing the interaction between borrowing, debt and rising interest costs, including the OBR's snowball mechanism. OBR.
Drehmann, Juselius and Korinek, Bank for International Settlements, “Accounting for debt service: the painful legacy of credit booms”, 2017. Cross country evidence connecting borrowing, later debt servicing, weaker future output and financial crises. BIS.
Bank for International Settlements, Working Paper 501. Evidence that high debt servicing burdens can weigh on later expenditure and credit growth. BIS.
Favara and Imbs, “Credit Supply and the Price of Housing”, American Economic Review, 2015. Evidence that externally driven increases in mortgage credit can raise house prices, particularly where housing supply responds poorly. American Economic Association.
Greenwald and Guren, “Do Credit Conditions Move House Prices?”, American Economic Review, 2025. Estimates that credit standards explained between 32 and 53 per cent of the housing boom examined in the study. American Economic Association.
Bank of England, “About a rate of general interest: how monetary policy transmits”, 2024. Evidence on the transfer between borrowers and savers and the different effects this has on household spending. Bank of England.
Foulis, Hazell, Mian and Tracey, Bank of England, 2026. Research using around six million UK mortgage observations to examine the relationship between mortgage rates, borrowing, house prices and consumption. Bank of England.
Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book V, Chapter III, “Of Public Debts”, 1776. Smith's original discussion of permanent public borrowing, taxation, interest and the transfer of fiscal burdens to posterity. Adam Smith Works.